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This paper examines issues of life-cycle saving, growth, and aging in Taiwan. 
We are mainly concerned with standard issues of  life-cycle saving and their 
implications for the living standards of the elderly. We investigate whether sav- 
ing appears to be motivated by  life-cycle factors, how income growth has af- 
fected the profiles of income, consumption, and saving, and how changes in 
the demographic structure of Taiwan have influenced saving behavior. We use 
data from  15 consecutive  household  income and expenditure surveys, from 
1976 through 1990. Although there is no panel element to these data, the large 
number of households surveyed (approximately  14,000  per year) and the large 
number of cross sections allows us to track cohorts of people through time and 
to observe the evolution of their levels of  income, consumption, and saving. 
Taiwan provides an excellent laboratory in which to study the determinants 
of household saving. First, as table 9.1 shows, the last four decades have seen 
both very rapid growth and very high saving rates. The annual growth of  GNP 
per capita averaged 4.3 percent in the 1950s, 7.0 percent in the 1970s, and 6.7 
percent in the 1980s, and although the oil price shocks of  the early 1970s and 
1980s were associated with periods of relatively slow growth, there is no evi- 
dence that per capita growth rates are beginning to slow. Indeed, growth rates 
in the latter half of the 1980s exceeded any in the previous three decades. The 
high saving rates are also documented in table 9.1. The national accounts data 
show that gross national saving as a fraction of GNP has increased over the 
past  three decades, from an average of  18.7 percent  in  1961-65  to over 32 
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331 Table 9.1  Statistics on Income, Growth, Saving, and Population 
Income per 
Household  Household Savings  Population 
(base = 1986)  Rate  (millions) 
Gross Saving as a 
GNP per Capita  Growth in GNP  National  Percentage of  National  National 
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Notes; All numbers are from National Accounts statistics (from Taiwanese Statistical Office) unless otherwise indicated. National Accounts household savings rate 
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percent in  1976-90.  Household saving represents a large fraction of national 
saving, and the national accounts data show that roughly 50 percent of national 
saving is done by households, even if we exclude the savings of private corpo- 
rations.  What is more, the household survey data that we use yield  savings 
figures that  are of  comparable magnitude to  those in the national accounts. 
This situation stands in sharp contrast to that in many developing countries, 
where survey data yield savings estimates that are much lower than those in 
the national accounts. 
The second feature of Taiwan that is relevant to life-cycle saving is its rapid 
transition  over the last several decades from high to low population growth; 
see again table 9.1. In the 1950s, Taiwan’s rate of population growth averaged 
4.13 percent per year, reflecting the influx of immigrants from mainland China 
and then a postwar baby boom. The rate declined slowly through the early and 
middle 1960s and fell sharply in the late  1960s and early  1970s. The overall 
decline in the rate of population growth masks two offsetting factors, both of 
which are important to our topic. Life expectancy has increased, and there has 
been a sharp drop in fertility. In 1961, a 60-year-old male had a life expectation 
of 13.92 years. By 1990, this expectation had increased to 17.93  years (Repub- 
lic of  China  1991). For females, comparable numbers are  17.85 and  20.51 
years. The decline in population growth rates despite these increases reflect the 
behavior of fertility, which began to fall  in the late  1960s. The total fertility 
rate  fell from 6.1  in  1958 to  1.9 in  1985. An important implication  of  this 
decline is that Taiwanese who are currently young will, when old, have far 
fewer adult children to provide potential  support than do those who are old 
now. In fact, the fraction of the elderly who live with their children is already 
beginning to decline (see Lo 1987), although this may be due more to an in- 
crease in wealth that makes independent living possible, rather than to a de- 
cline in the number of children who can potentially provide care. 
High growth, declining fertility, and increasing life expectancy all have con- 
sequences for saving that are predictable by  standard life-cycle theory, and it 
is these predictions that we examine in this paper. We first investigate whether 
the observed patterns  in consumption and saving across different households 
can be fit into the life-cycle story. In particular, we examine the basic implica- 
tion of a life-cycle model that savings should (at least eventually) decline with 
age. We also examine cohort effects in consumption and in saving. Those who 
are currently young in Taiwan have lifetime earnings that are many times larger 
than those of their parents  and grandparents, and we test whether their con- 
sumption profiles are shifted in the appropriate way. We also look for the in- 
creased saving rates among the younger cohorts that might be expected in the 
face of rising life expectancy and falling numbers of children. We find reason- 
able conformity been the Taiwanese facts and the life-cycle theory; it is cer- 
tainly possible to interpret the broad features of the data in life-cycle terms. 
We  also look at the familiar implications of  the life-cycle  model  for the 
relationship between savings and productivity  growth.  High income growth 334  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
across cohorts should yield high national savings rates, because younger savers 
have a much higher lifetime wealth level than do older dissavers, a mechanism 
that links growth to saving at the aggregate, but not at the individual, level. We 
find strong evidence  of  a link between  growth and  saving at the  individual 
level, something that is not predicted by the theory. We also run a battery of 
standard excess sensitivity tests, which do not provide any evidence against the 
life-cycle story. Even so, we find a very marked coherence between  the age 
profiles of consumption  and income for different cohorts, a coherence that is 
consistent with the life-cycle but strongly suggests a more direct link between 
consumption and income. We find it hard to rationalize such a relationship in 
the Taiwanese context, so that the life-cycle model remains perhaps the most 
satisfactory account of our evidence. 
9.1  The Survey Data 
The data used in this paper come from a time series of household surveys, 
the Personal Income Distribution Surveys, collected in the Taiwan area of the 
Republic of China (ROC), or Taiwan for short, in the 15 calendar years 1976- 
90. In  1976 and 1977, the sample sizes are a little over 9,000 households, but 
from  1978 there are over  14,000 households  in each survey. The number of 
persons  covered  varies from around 50,000 in the first two years to around 
75,000 later. New  samples are drawn  each year, so that it is not possible  to 
track individual households  over time; instead, we shall track individual age 
cohorts through the successive surveys. 
The survey design is described in Republic of China (1989). For income and 
consumption, data are collected both from interviews and from diaries. At the 
single interview, questions are asked about major items of income and expen- 
diture in the past year, while the diaries, maintained throughout the year and 
regularly  inspected  by  field workers, keep track of  all items of  income and 
expenditure.  Only  a  “small  number  of  households”  keep the  diaries; these 
households are also interviewed, and the results of comparing the two methods 
are “used to check andor correct results of all interviews in the survey.” The 
survey is a comprehensive one and collects information  on household  struc- 
ture, on socioeconomic characteristics (including industry, occupation, and ed- 
ucation), on household  expenditures in  some detail,  and on the incomes by 
source of the household  and of each of  its members. All money  amounts in 
this paper are in real N.T. dollars, base year = 1986. 
Our impression from the work that we have done and from the results re- 
ported  below  is that  the data  are of  good quality.  One of  the  attractions  of 
working with data from a high saving country is the ability to study saving at 
the household level. For many developing countries, it is difficult to find much 
reported saving in household survey data, even in those cases where national 
accounts  data  indicate  that  households  as  a  whole  are  saving  substantial 
amounts; see, for example, Visaria (1980) for several Asian countries, Paxson 335  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
(1992) for Thailand, and  Deaton  (1992a) for C8te d’Ivoire. The Taiwanese 
survey data do not have this problem, and the high national saving rates are 
reflected  in the behavior  of the individual households.  Table 9.1 shows that, 
according to the national accounts, saving by households has varied around 20 
percent of  household income since 1975, while the figures from the surveys, 
although far from identical, are of  the same order of  magnitude. Given that 
saving is the difference between  two large magnitudes, each estimated  with 
error, given that the coverage of the surveys and the national accounts is differ- 
ent, and  given  the  difficulties that  are typically  encountered in  reconciling 
household and national accounts, we view the correspondence as remarkably 
close. For household incomes, which are also shown in table 9.1, the survey 
data  are again  close to  those from the national  accounts,  with  a maximum 
discrepancy of 5 percent. 
Since we shall be concerned  with  saving within a life-cycle context, it is 
useful to look first at the demographic information in the surveys. Figure 9.1 
shows the age-sex pyramids  for each of  the survey years; as with all of the 
summary statistics presented in the paper, numbers are weighted by the appro- 
priate inflation factors so as to provide estimates of the underlying population. 
No inflation  factors are available for the  first two years,  1976 and  1977, for 
which the results are presented in unweighted form; evidence from the other 
years suggests that the unweighted data are unlikely to be misleading. 
Note first that the surveys evidently fail to capture a substantial number of 
young males aged 20-25,  presumably those in college or engaged in military 
service. In the last few years, 1988-90,  a similar phenomenon is beginning to 
be evident for young females over a somewhat broader age range. This may 
again be related to college, and indeed more than half of college students in 
Taiwan are women;  it  may  also reflect  employment  patterns  among young 
women. In any case, these people, both male and female, are “missing” as a 
result of the survey design, and not because of any similar feature in the popu- 
lation. 
Another feature of these survey demographics reflects a genuine peculiarity 
of the Taiwanese population. In all years, there is an excess of middle-aged to 
older men over women in the same age group; see the sex ratios by age in figure 
9.2. In the first year, 1976, the number of males per 100 females is greater than 
100, over the range of ages 40-65,  reaching a peak of 140 at age 50. This peak 
ages one year per year, and by 1990, there are somewhat less than 140 65-year- 
old males for each 65-year-old female. These numbers are a consequence  of 
the cohort of predominantly male “mainlanders” who came to Taiwan in 1949, 
and an unusually  large fraction of whom have never mamed. These people 
differ in a number of other respects from the rest of the population;  for ex- 
ample, many were soldiers, and a high proportion have government pensions 
(or pension rights), and so they provide a group whose life-cycle consumption 
and saving behavior can be expected to differ from that of other Taiwanese. 
The changing shapes of the pyramids also shows very clearly the marked 336  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
Fig. 9.1  Age-sex pyramids 
Nore: Positive values represent males. Negative values represent females. 
(and remarkable) aging of the population over the 15-year period of our sam- 
ple. Figure 9.3 shows, for each year, the fractions of the population older than 
each age. In 1976, .046 of  the population were over 60; in 1990, the fraction 
was  .092. The ratio of  the elderly to their surviving children, although still 
high because of older fertility rates, will fall rapidly over time. For example, 
Hermalin, Ofstedal, and Li (1991) indicate that women aged 61-65  in  1990 
had, on average, 5.1 children ever born in their lifetimes. The number of chil- 
dren ever born is expected to drop to 3.6 for those aged 46-50  in  1990 and to 
2.4 for those aged 3 1-35  in  1990. Although numbers of children ever born is 337  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
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same as children  surviving into their parent's  old  age, the evidence 
strongly suggests that many of the current generation of young adults cannot 
expect to avail themselves of  the traditional Chinese pattern whereby elderly 
parents move into their son's home. This idea is supported by  survey evidence 
from Chang (1987), which indicates that a growing fraction of currently young 
Taiwanese women do not  expect to live with their  sons when they  are old. 
Absent  state intervention in the form of  social security (and although social 
security is being expanded in Taiwan, the coverage and amounts are still very 
small), the current generation of young workers has a strong incentive to save 




Fig. 9.3  Age distribution of the population, by year 
paper is to see if we can find evidence of such an increase in life-cycle saving 
among the young and whether it can plausibly be attributed to the effects of 
the demographic transition. 
9.2  Constructing Cohorts 
For most of the interesting questions about saving and the life cycle, it is 
necessary to track individuals over time and to observe the changes in con- 
sumption, income, and saving as people age. Although we cannot track indi- 
vidual households in the data, we can track “cohorts” of households, with co- 
horts defined according to their year of birth. For each year of data, we average 
the variables of  interest by age of individuals or age of  household head and 
then track, not the same individuals, but the sample from the same cohort one 
year older in the next survey. In this way, we can follow cohort means for 15 
years of each age cohort of households or individuals. We do this both at the 
level of  the household,  with age defined by the age of  the head, and at the 
level of the person, again using age as the grouping variable. Where we have 
individual data, for example on earnings, the (sample weighted) cohort means 
of individuals by age provide unbiased estimates of mean earnings for the un- 
derlying population  of that age. For other variables, which can be collected 
only at the household level, matters are a good deal less clear. Averaging by 
the age of the household head has the inevitable effect of confounding genuine 339  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
changes in stable households with changes in both household formation and in 
headship. For example, since earnings (eventually  j decline with age and since 
older men cease (by definition in these data) to be heads when they cease to be 
the main earner, households with older heads will be an increasingly selected 
sample of  the population and will therefore display behavior that increasingly 
disguises actual patterns of  household change over time. For example, house- 
holds with older heads will be those whose head has unusually high earnings 
compared with  others  of  his  or her  cohort, or those  who  have  an  unusual 
amount of wealth that enables the household to survive as an independent unit. 
As a consequence, and if, for argument’s sake, savings rates are positively cor- 
related with earnings, or are positively correlated with wealth (households who 
are predisposed  to save are typically richer than those who are not), we may 
observe that, at high ages, household saving rates increase with the age of the 
head even though assets are typically being run down in old age. 
The alternative, of averaging over individuals by age, although minimizing 
selectivity,  is difficult, because  so many  variables  are  reported  only  at the 
household level, so that we have to impute individual consumption or incomes 
based on  those of the household to which they belong. Old people who live 
with their children are therefore attributed some fraction of household income 
or consumption, an attribution  that  is essentially  arbitrary when there is no 
information about intrahousehold allocation. These problems are not soluble, 
and they have to be kept continuously  in mind when  interpreting the results 
presented below. 
Table 9.2 reports the numbers of households in five selected household co- 
horts, for each year of the survey data; table 9.3 records the same information 
for the numbers of people in the “individual” cohorts. To save space, we show 
numbers for only five cohorts, but we have constructed (and will use) the co- 
horts at each age, although in some cases it will be necessary to eliminate the 
youngest and the oldest groups. In total, the data allow us to calculate  1,031 
household head agetyear pairs for the household data and 1,16  1 agelyear pairs 
for the individual data; only 75 of these are shown in each table. Cohorts are 
defined by year of birth, or more conveniently, by age in 1976. Hence, the first 
column of table 9.2 shows the sample representation of households headed by 
those born in 1956, who were age 20 in 1976 and 34 in 1990. The increase in 
numbers, from 26 households in  1976 to 640 households in  1990, shows not 
that the cohort of those born in 1956 is increasing, nor that the sample is incor- 
rectly drawn, but that 34-year-olds are much more likely to be household heads 
than 20-year-olds. For the older cohorts, the variation in sample size is much 
less, and it is these middle years of household headship for which the averages 
are likely to be most accurate, both because there are more households in each 
average, and because selection problems are less severe. 
Figure 9.4 shows how the cohort grouping can be used to show both the life- 
cycle pattern of family formation and the cohort effects of falling fertility. The 
age of the head of the household  is plotted on the horizontal axis, while the 340  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
Table 9.2  Numbers of Households in Selected Household Cohorts (indicated by 
age of head in 1976) 
Cohort  I  Cohort 11  Cohort 2  1  Cohort 3  I  Cohort 41 
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vertical axis shows the average number of children in the household; children 
are here defined according to the official survey definition, which is 20 years 
old or younger. The plotted points are connected when we are following the 
same cohort through time, but different cohorts are left unconnected. To avoid 
complete clutter, we show only every fifth cohort, so that the first line segment 
on the left-hand side of the figure shows the number of children in households 
headed by those who were age 20 in 1976; by the time these people are age 35 
in  1990, they are well launched into their child-rearing years and have a little 
under  two  children  per household.  The second  cohort, the  25-year-olds  in 
1976, overlap with the first cohort for 10 years, but take us another five years 
into the life cycle, since these people are age 40 in the last, 1990 survey. To 
the extent that these two cohorts and the next one overlap, the profiles of chil- 
dren by  age have similar shapes, with the maximum number of  children at- 
tained around age 40 and falling thereafter, as the oldest leave home and new 
children cease to be born. However, the falling fertility shows up in the profiles 
as pronounced vertical shifts, or cohort effects, as we move from one cohort to 
the next. 
One way  of  turning these pictures into numbers is to fit to these means a 
polynomial in age together with a series of cohort dummies, one for each date 
of birth. For figure 9.4, we do this only for those older than age 19 and younger 
than age 61, so as to exclude those cohorts where there are few individuals in 
the means. The estimated  cohort  effects  show that, apart from the first five 
groups, aged 20-24  in 1976, which we know to be unreliable both because of 
the sample design and because of  selectivity, there is an  average  decline of 
0.06 children per year, so over the 35-year age span, from heads aged 25 to 341  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
Table 9.3  Numbers of Persons in Selected Person Cohorts (indicated by age in 
1976) 
Cohort  I  Cohort I1  Cohort 2 1  Cohort 3  1  Cohort 41 
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heads aged 60, there has been a decline in number of children per household 
of 2.3, from 4.7 I  to 2.44 at the maximum of the profile. Of course, this measure 
is neither a measure of the decline in children ever born, nor of children avail- 
able to parents in old age. but it nevertheless seems likely that for those in their 
mid-thirties  now,  there will be only half as many sons to look after them  in 
old-age as there are now for those who are 70 years old. 
The demographic transition  is one remarkable  fact about modern  Taiwan; 
another is its rate of economic growth and the effects on the earnings of the 
different cohorts. Figure 9.5, which is constructed for individuals and not for 
households,  shows the cohort earnings  patterns for every  fifth cohort, again 
starting with those who were 20 years old in 1976. Again we can make out the 
usual  pattern  of  earnings  with  age, but  superimposed is very  rapid  within- 
cohort growth, at least for some of the cohorts. For those aged 25 in 1976,  real 
earnings have grown at the astonishing rate of  12 percent per year over the  15 
years since. For older cohorts, the amount is less, falling with age and eventu- 
ally becoming negative for the cohort aged 50 in  1976. The bias of  earnings 
growth toward the young is plausibly attributable to the much higher levels of 
education  among young  cohorts  and  is  consistent  with  evidence  from  the 
United States, where earnings functions frequently show a positive interaction 
between education and experience. In the United States, much of the growth in 
earnings among the young is associated with job changes and with the greater 
tendency of  young workers to move from one job to another. The same phe- 
nomenon might well hold true in Taiwan, with young people moving into the 
new jobs created by the rapid rate of economic growth. 
Figure 9.6 shows nonlabor income by age and by cohort. In a country with 
savings rates as high as those in Taiwan, total income behaves very differently 
from earnings, and the figure shows how  asset income and transfers replace 
earnings with age, so that total  income does not collapse with age nearly as 
rapidly as does earnings. Lo (1987) provides more detail on the composition 
of income of  the elderly and on how it has changed over time. 
9.3  A Life-Cycle Interpretation of Consumption and Saving 
With the demographic and earnings environment described, we turn to con- 
sumption behavior and the extent to which it fits the standard life-cycle frame- 
work. We are particularly concerned with whether Taiwan’s high saving ratio 
can be attributed to its high rate of growth through the traditional life-cycle 
mechanism, with younger, richer cohorts being responsible for the bulk of the 
saving. We also want to look for traces of  the demographic transition in the 
behavior of younger cohorts and, in particular, to investigate whether they are 
saving not just large amounts because their earnings are high, but are actually 
saving at a higher rate than their predecessors. 
The cohort data are ideally suited for examining these issues. There are a 
large number of  cohorts, with younger cohorts very much richer in lifetime 343  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
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resources than  their parents or grandparents.  Even  at  10 percent  per annum 
real earnings growth, which is less than the 12 percent average experienced by 
the younger cohorts, 25-year-olds in Taiwan can expect real lifetime earnings 
that are nearly  11 times greater than those of 50-year-olds. At the same time, 
since the data run for 15 consecutive years, we observe behavior at the same 
age for a range of  different cohorts, so that it is possible to separate cohort 
(wealth) effects from age (preference) effects. Indeed, as we shall show below, 
it is even possible to say something about the effects of common macroeco- 
nomic shocks, as represented by  year effects. 
With no income uncertainty, the life-cycle model predicts that consumption 
is a function  of  lifetime resources  (earnings  plus inherited  assets), with  the 
fraction of resources consumed being a function of age, as dictated by prefer- 
ences and the life-cycle variation in household size and composition. We write 
(1)  c = g(a)W, 
where W is the sum of assets and the discounted present value of current and 
expected future labor income, and g(a)  is some function of age a. Taking logs, 
we have 
(2)  lnc = lng(a) + 1nW 
This equation holds at the level of the individual, but given its additive struc- 
ture, it can be averaged  over all households  of the  same age (as defined by 
head’s age) in each year, so that the average of the logarithms of consumption 
for  each  age/year  combination  should  be  additively  decomposable into  a 
wealth term, which is constant within cohorts, and an age term. Equation (2) 
can then be estimated nonparametrically using the cohort data, by  regressing 
the cohort averages of the logarithm of consumption  against cohort dummies 
and age dummies. 
The raw data on total household consumption are plotted in figure 9.7 in the 
same format as the earlier cohort diagrams; the figure shows the average of 
consumption, although it is the average of log consumption that will be used 
in the regressions. (Similar pictures for consumption per head, or consumption 
per adult equivalent, for various definitions of the latter, give very similar re- 
sults.) Figure 9.7 shows a remarkable resemblance to figure 9.5, for earnings, 
a resemblance that will be explored further in the next section. Note again that, 
while there is a distinctly visible life-cycle pattern to consumption. rising with 
age and then falling, there is also a great deal of within-cohort consumption 
growth, especially for the younger cohorts. Clearly, old and young households 
are  not  sufficiently  altruistically  linked  for  their  consumption  to  move  in 
lockstep. 
The results can be given an explicit life-cycle interpretation by  estimating 
equation (2),  and the results are given, not in numerical form, since there are 
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effects (age in  1976) and age effects are shown together. In panel A equation 
(2) is estimated with age and cohort dummies only, while in panel B we show 
the age and cohort effects when the (average) numbers of  adults and children 
are added as additional regressors. (Additional adults markedly increase con- 
sumption; additional children have little effect.) As predicted by the life-cycle 
model for a growing economy, the cohort effects decline steadily from younger 
to older cohorts; both  graphs  show  that,  at the same age, consumption  in- 
creases at about 4 percent per cohort, so that, for example, the consumption at 
age 40 of  someone born in 1950 is on average 3.4 times larger than the con- 
sumption at age of 40 of someone born in 1925. As is to be expected, the age 
effects depend to some extent on whether the household composition variables 
are explicitly included in the regressions. In either case, the age profile is much 
steeper than  is typically  seen in the United  States, or even  in other LDCs, 
flattening out only very gradually with age. In both panels, consumption falls 
with age only after age 60, although the decline is less pronounced in the bot- 
tom panel,  where we  control for the numbers of  household  members.  Note 
again, however, that the selection effects should make us very skeptical about 
conclusions for households with elderly heads. While steep age-consumption 
profiles  are  unusual,  they  are  certainly  not  inconsistent  with  the  life-cycle 
model. In an economy growing as rapidly as Taiwan’s, real interest rates are 
very high, especially in the large and rapidly developing small-business sector, 
so that there are strong intertemporal incentives to postpone consumption and 
for consumption to grow rapidly over time. Alternatively, it is possible that the 
Taiwanese are more patient than most other people, or that the Chinese venera- 
tion for the elderly extends to a perceived high marginal utility of consumption 
in old age. 
One feature of figure 9.7 is not accounted for by either the age or the cohort 
effects in figure 9.8. This is the fact that the individual cohort “tracks” have 
similar shapes, so that, for example, almost all show a decline in consumption 
with age between the fourth and fifth observations. These are clearly caused 
by  the presence  of  macroeconomic effects that  impinge on all cohorts to a 
greater or lesser degree, but which are located in real time and which cannot 
be explained by cohort or age effects. The obvious extension to equation (2)  is 
to allow for fixed-year effects, so that the consumption equation becomes 
(3)  lncai = lng(a) + lnW,  + 0,, 
where 0, is a year fixed effect, and the subscripts a, b, and t denote age, cohort, 
and time, respectively.  Note that  given  age and time, cohort  is determined; 
indeed we have been measuring b as age in 1976, which is a -  t + 1976. 
Equation (2) is an implication of the life-cycle model of consumption when 
there is no uncertainty,  so that cohort wealth levels are never revised. Once 
uncertainty is admitted, wealth levels will be revised in response to macroeco- 
nomic  shocks, so that the life-cycle model with uncertainty provides at least 
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model under uncertainty is not as clean as was the link with equation (2) under 
certainty, since the effects of a common macroeconomic shock on wealth lev- 
els ought to vary with age. While it is possible in principle to include interac- 
tion terms between year and cohort effects, unrestricted estimation would not 
be possible even with the current data. Nevertheless, the year effects are cer- 
tainly present in the data, and it seems useful to estimate equation  (3) as an 
approximation to the more general model, if only to ensure that the failure to 
accommodate the year effects does not contaminate the estimates of the age 
and cohort effects, with which the year dummies are strongly correlated. 
The estimation of equation (3) requires some thought about the relationship 
between  age, cohort, and  year  dummies. Write C,  X and A  for matrices  of 
dummy variables of  cohort, year, and age dummies; each matrix has  1,03  1 
rows, the number of  yearhead’s-age pairs, while the numbers of columns are 
65 for cohorts (for those aged  11 in  1976 to those aged 75 in  1976), 15 for 
years, and 51 for ages (from age 25 to age 75). Note that we have truncated on 
age of head, eliminating those below 25 to avoid the “missing” males below 
that  age group and those  above 75 to  avoid the very imprecisely  estimated 
cohort means from households with very old heads. Of course, there are no 
heads of households  in  1976 who were then  11 years old, but we do include 
one observation on that cohort, when they are 25-year-old heads of household 
in  1990. Equation (3) can be rewritten in terms of the dummy variable matri- 
ces as 
(4)  Ins,, = LP + Cy + Aa + Y+ + E, 
where L is a vector of units, and the vectors a,  y, and + are parameters of age, 
cohort, and year effects.  As usual,  one category  from each set of  dummies 
must be excluded, and doing so presents no nonstandard issues of  interpreta- 
tion.  However, the  dependency between  age, cohort, and year  introduces  a 
slightly less standard complication. 
Let on  denote the (transpose of the) vector  (1, 2, 3, . . . ,  n).  Then, since 
cohort  is age minus  year plus  a constant,  the  matrices  of  dummy variables 
satisfy the exact linear relationship 
where n,, n,,  and n, are the numbers of cohorts, ages, and years. To see that the 
constant term in equation (5) equals n,, note that the youngest cohort of people 
(aged 11 in 1976) will be the youngest age of  25 in the nith  year. As a result of 
the identity expressed by equation (5), the parameters in equation (4) are not 
identified, even after one category has been dropped from each set of dummies. 
In particular, if the vectors a,  y, p, and $ are replaced by &, p, v, and 4,  where 
(6)  C%  = Ci -  KUna,  = P -  n,K, 
p = Y  + KU,lc3  4 = $ + Ku,z,, 348  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
and K is some arbitrary nonzero scalar, then, as is easily checked by substitu- 
tion into equation (4), there is no consequence for the predicted value of con- 
sumption. The way that this works can readily be seen from the original cohort- 
consumption plots in figure 9.7. For the first cohort, suppose that there is no 
cohort effect, so that the first trace is the sum of age and year effects. Since the 
cohort ages one year at a time, adding equal amounts to year and age dummies 
will leave the trace unchanged. The trace for the second cohort starts from the 
same year but one year of age younger, so that the second trace will also be 
left unchanged  if  the second cohort effect is incremented by one, and so on 
through the cohorts according to equation (6).  In effect, any trend in the data 
can be arbitrarily reinterpreted as a year trend or (since year equals age minus 
cohort plus a constant) as trends in ages and cohorts that are equal but of oppo- 
site sign. However, it is clear that the appropriate normalization is to require 
that the year effects sum to zero. As an example, consider a hypothetical case 
in which there are apparently no cohort or age effects, but where the logarithm 
of  consumption  increases by 4  per annum for all age groups. Consider what 
the cohort diagram figure 9.6 would look like in such a case. Each cohort trace 
would increase by C  per year of age, but each cohort trace would start at the 
same horizontal level as the previous one, or equivalently, at a vertical shift of 
4  below it. A steady growth in year effects simply means that consumption is 
growing with age and declining with cohort, and it is appropriate to attribute 
the effects to age and cohort, not time. 
In the light of this discussion, we estimate  equation (4) with the first age 
group, and the fifteenth cohort omitted, so that the reference group is that for 
a household headed by a 25-year-old in  1976. The 15-year dummies are con- 
strained to be orthogonal to a time trend and to add to zero. The “base year” is 
thus a timeless average of all years, and any time trend is attributed to cohorts 
and ages, not to time. 
Figure 9.9 shows the resulting age, cohort, and year effects, with (botrom 
panels) and without (top  panels) the addition of the average adult and children 
variables. The figure also shows the same decomposition for the average of the 
logarithms of total income (earnings plus asset and other income) and for the 
“saving ratio,” measured here as the difference  of  the logarithms of income 
and consumption. (For Taiwanese saving ratios, the approximation is not par- 
ticularly  accurate, but the logarithmic form is convenient, given that we are 
working with the logarithms of income and consumption.) The consumption 
profiles  are not markedly different from those in the figure 9.8, even though 
the year effects are quite significant, with an associated F-value of 59.8 in the 
basic model and 81.5 in the model with adults and children. The corresponding 
F-values for age and cohort effects are, respectively, 408.8 and 373.1 in the 
basic model, and 437.0 and 60.4 in the extended model, and it is these effects 
that are our primary concern in examining life-cycle behavior. Conditional on 
cohort and age effects, adults increase income by  about as much as they in- 349  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
age  2'  ncusenola  hea3  3j~  2'  ":lsehC;:  heaZ  ~n  1?'E  year 
_____  :s<y; 
~.....  ln(C! 
~. -  sly  =  lr(y: -  :q:c) 
Fig. 9.9  Age, cohort, and year effects in consumption, income, and saving rates, for 
household heads 
crease consumption and have little effect on household saving, while children 
decrease income with little effect on consumption and so decrease saving. 
The cohort effects are larger the younger the cohort for consumption, for 
income, and for the saving ratio, so that, at the same age, those born later in 
calendar time are saving a higher  fraction  of  their incomes.  This is exactly 
what we might expect from the life-cycle model in the Taiwanese context in 
the face of rapidly declining  fertility and rapidly rising life expectancy.  Al- 
though the cohort differences in saving ratios are too large to be plausible in 
the model without the addition of numbers of adults and children, the extended 
model shows a flatter profile of savings rates across cohorts. For example, the 
saving cohort effects in the second plot in the bottom panel of figure 9.9 show 
a difference of -0.23  in In (ylc)  between the cohort aged 11 in 1976 (aged 25 
in 1990) and the cohort 35 years older, aged 60 in 1990. The average value of 
In  (y/c)  in  1990 for households  headed by 25-year-olds was 0.276, a saving 
rate of 24 percent, so that the model predicts a saving rate of 4.5 percent for 
the older cohort at the same age, i.e., in 1955. As we saw above, this is exactly 
the comparison group for which the number of children has fallen by  a half, 
and the increase in the saving rate is perhaps of the order of magnitude required 
to replace family by autarkic old-age insurance. 
The age effects in the left-hand panels are not obviously consistent with the 
life-cycle story. The rising age-profile of consumption is matched by an even 
more rapidly rising age pattern of income, so that the saving rate, instead of 
being positive at young ages and negative later, shows a steady increase with 
age. If such a result is correct, an increase in the rate of growth of productivity 350  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
would decrease, not increase, aggregate saving since it would redistribute in- 
come toward the young, who have the lowest saving propensity, at least pro- 
vided  cohort  effects  are eliminated, as would  be expected  when  the demo- 
graphic transition is complete. However, it is quite likely that the age effects 
on saving are contaminated by  the selection processes for headship, certainly 
at old ages, and perhaps also at young ages. As already discussed, it is entirely 
plausible that those households headed by older people are those with an un- 
usually high propensity to save, so that the right-hand panels in figure 9.9 are 
revealing only the selection effects, and not the true patterns of saving ratios. 
Nor can this problem be resolved by  switching from a household to an individ- 
ual basis, as is done in figure 9.10, which repeats figure 9.9, but with averages 
taken over individuals, not households. The problem is that here we are still 
looking at household incomes, consumption, and saving, only the household 
magnitudes have been attributed to individuals. The age effects on saving are 
now even more extreme, because the old individuals on the right of the diagram 
are now predominately  located in households  headed by younger adults, so 
that we lose the flattening of  income, consumption, and savings profiles with 
age that is observed in the household-level data. 
Our results can thus be interpreted in terms of a more-or-less standard life- 
cycle model, at least provided we are allowed to choose a desired consumption 
profile that rises  rapidly with age, which indeed is theoretically  plausible in 
the circumstances. Saving rates are systematically higher for the younger co- 
horts, and the effect is consistent with the increased need to provide for old 
age. And if we fail to observe any life-cycle profile in saving rates by age, there 
are statistical grounds that can perhaps explain what we see. 
9.5  Alternative Explanations: Tracking and Growth 
The ability to give a life-cycle interpretation to the data does not mean that 
the life-cycle model is in fact correct, and in this section we look at some more 
negative evidence. In particular, we consider whether there is evidence in these 
data that consumption “tracks” income by more than would be expected if the 
life-cycle model is correct, and we look more closely at the relationship be- 
tween saving and growth. 
Tracking has been found in other data; see particularly Carroll and Summers 
(1991)  for the  United  States  and  Deaton  (1992b)  for Thailand  and  Cbte 
d’Ivoire. However, in all these examples, the large mass of households accu- 
mulate little or nothing, and saving is used to buffer short-term fluctuations in 
income; in the absence of accumulation, consumption and income must move 
together in the long run. However, there is certainly no lack of accumulation 
by households in Taiwan, so that we should expect to observe a greater decou- 
pling of consumption and income, even over long life-cycle spans. Taiwanese 
households have demonstrated their ability to accumulate enough assets to ac- 
complish  even  “low-frequency”  consumption  smoothing. Although  the evi- 351  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
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Fig. 9.10  Age, cohort, and year effects in consumption, income, and saving rates, for 
individuals 
dence in the previous section is consistent with the life-cycle story, it does not 
immediately follow that much long-term smoothing is being done, since the 
preferred profile of consumption may not call for it. It is therefore necessary 
to look at the data in a different way. 
Figure 9.11 shows the same data on consumption and income by age as in 
figure 9.5, but with a separate diagram for each cohort, and with income and 
consumption  shown together. Once again, we see the marked differences in 
the  shape of the profile between the younger  and older cohorts, with much 
more rapid growth for younger households. We  also see the growing saving 
ratio as a widening between consumption and income over time. But the most 
marked feature of figure 9.11 is the extraordinary coherence between the pat- 
terns of consumption and income for each of the cohorts. The shape of each 
changes with age, but they  change together,  with consumption traclung in- 
come, year by year, and age by age. Such a picture suggests a crude Keynesian 
consumption function, with consumption strongly linked to income. And yet 
we have seen in the previous section that the data, which are the same as those 
used here, are consistent with a life-cycle interpretation. The key to the recon- 
ciliation is the fact that in the earlier analysis, in figure 9.9, the cohort effects, 
the age effects, and the year effects have very similar shapes, across cohorts, 
age, and time, for both consumption and income. While this is consistent with 
the life-cycle model, only the coherence between income shocks and consump- 
tion shocks is directly predicted by it, although it could also be argued that in 
a rapidly growing economy, real returns will be high, so that optimal intertem- 352  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
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Fig. 9.11  Consumption and income, by age of household head 
poral planning should generate rapid consumption  growth to match rapid in- 
come growth.  Even  so, figure 9.11 is strongly  suggestive  of  some simpler 
model embodying a much more direct link between consumption and income. 
That said, it is no simple matter to think of a coherent alternative. Liquidity 
constraints make very little sense in an environment in which so many people 
are saving so much. Nor do buffering models seem relevant here, whether with 
borrowing constraints  as in Deaton  (1991) or with precautionary  saving and 
large shocks as in Carroll (1991). Both of these models work by supposing that 
people generally wish to accumulate little or nothing, but use saving to buffer 353  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
consumption against short-term fluctuations in income. For such people, con- 
sumption tracks income because, in the long run, consumption is identical to 
income. That is not the case here. Perhaps the life-cycle model still provides 
the best theoretically consistent account of the facts. 
Before accepting that position, consider the positive relationship  between 
saving and growth, perhaps the most celebrated  prediction  of  the life-cycle 
model. We have already seen that the estimated models do not clearly support 
this prediction in the Taiwanese case, since the saving rate appears to increase 
with age, although we cannot use this to reject the model because of  the in- 
creasing selection of household heads with age. Even so, thefuct that there is 
a connection between saving and growth seems hard to dispute. Taiwan, like 
Korea, Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, is among the most rapidly growing 
and highest saving economies in the world, and the cross-country relationship 
between saving and growth has been repeatedly documented. Furthermore, the 
productivity  slowdown  in the OECD countries  has been  accompanied  by  a 
reduction in national saving ratios, essentially without exception (see Modigli- 
ani  1990). However, there is still far from general acceptance that the mecha- 
nism is that of  the life-cycle model, whereby slower growth redistributes  na- 
tional  income away  from younger,  saving  cohorts,  to their  lower-saving  or 
dissaving elders. Indeed, for the United States, Bosworth, Burtless, and Sabel- 
haus (1991) have undertaken  the very difficult task of  interpreting the time- 
series evidence from the various Consumer Expenditure Surveys and have pro- 
vided strong evidence that the decline in saving in the United States has been 
a decline that has affected all age groups; it is not the aggregation phenomenon 
that the life-cycle model requires. This evidence suggests that there is a mecha- 
nism linking growth and saving within cohorts, and it is this possibility in Tai- 
wan to which we now turn. 
The top panel of table 9.4 shows regressions of the “saving rate” (defined as 
before by  the logarithm of  the ratio of total income to consumption) against 
growth rates of earnings. These are run on the same averaged data displayed in 
the household diagrams above, with each observation corresponding to an age/ 
year pair, and once again include only ages 25-75.  As appropriate, averages 
are averages of the logarithms of the underlying household data, not the loga- 
rithms of averages, and all regressions are weighted by (the square root of) the 
number of households in the cohort average. The regression of the saving rate 
on the current rate of change of  earnings, i.e., the growth of current earnings 
over last period’s earnings, is not shown; it produces a strong positive coeffi- 
cient, but such a result tells us little, since measurement  error will induce a 
positive  correlation between  current saving and current income. Instead, the 
first line shows the regression of the saving rate on the first four lags of earn- 
ings growth; all the coefficients are positive and significantly different from 
zero. The second line explores the possibility that the relationship is between 
saving and current earnings growth, but using instrumental variables estima- 
tion to purge the measurement  error. Since measurement  error will induce a 354  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
Table 9.4  Saving Rates, Consumption Growth, and Earnings Growth 
F-Test for 
Effects Included  dlne  dlne-,  dlne  ~  dlne-,  dlne ,  Overidentification 
1. None 
2. Cohorts 
3. Cohorts and ages 




7. Cohorts and ages 
8. Cohorts, ages, and 
years 
Saving Rate Regressions: Iny-lnc 
0.0793  0. I049  0.0888 
(8.3)  (9.2)  (7.7) 
0.6995 
(1.6) 
0.0302  0.0483  0.0431 
(4.1  )  (5.5)  (4.9) 
0.2 I50 
(0.9) 
0.0187  0.0421  0.0430 
(2.3)  (4.1)  (4.2) 
0.2881 
(1.5) 
-0.0136  -0.0114  -0.0099 
(1.7)  (1 0  (0.9) 
0.03  18 
(0.7) 












































0.007  1 
(0.6) 
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Notes: The regressions in the top panel have the cohort average of the individual “saving rates” ln(y/c) as 
the dependent variable, where y is total income and c is consumption. In the first regression, In(y/c) is 
regressed on four lags of  earnings growth dne; in  the second, saving growth is regressed on current 
earnings growth by  instrumental variables, with the second through fourth lags of  earnings growth as 
instruments. The regressions are repeated with the inclusion of cohort effects, cohort and age effects, and 
cohort, age, and year effects. The bottom panel repeats the regressions with consumption growth as the 
dependent variable. All consumption regressions, OLS and IVE, exclude the first lag of earnings growth. 
All regressions include the average numbers of adults and children, and all are weighted by  the square 
root of the number of observations in each cohort. When computing the cohort averages of log earnings 
(used to construct earnings growth),  the few households with no earnings are assigned a value of earnings 
equal to one. 
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spurious correlation between successive lags of earnings growth, we use only 
the second and third lags as instruments. This regression shows no relationship 
between the saving rate and predictable earnings growth, and the overidentifi- 
cation test rejects the hypothesis that lagged growth rates affect saving rates 
only through  their ability to predict current growth. (Indeed they have little 
ability to predict current earning growth.) 
The rest of the top panel explores the same regressions but with the addition 
first of cohort dummies, then of cohort and age dummies, and finally of cohort, 
age, and year dummies. Given the  relationships that exist between  earnings 
growth, age, and cohorts, we would argue for including these dummies, but 
for excluding the year dummies,  since the  latter should be  subsumed in the 
effects for which we are testing. Although the coefficients are smaller than in 
the first row, the positive association between lagged growth of earnings and 
saving rates remains, at least until the year effects are introduced. None of the 
results suggest that the effect is working through anticipated earnings growth. 
These results show a positive relationship between saving rates and growth, a 
relationship that is not an aggregation effect, but holds for specific cohorts over 
time. Tracking the same group of people as they age, we find that their saving 
rate is higher in the years following rapid earnings growth. Because this effect 
is from lagged earnings growth, it has nothing to do with the standard response 
of saving to transitory income, and it is not an effect that is predicted by  life- 
cycle theory. 
These effects of within-cohort growth on within-cohort savings are a good 
deal smaller than those that are typically predicted from the aggregation effects 
of  life-cycle saving, or that are typically  found in the cross-country or long 
time-span evidence. Those findings, and again see Modigliani (1  990), typically 
show an effect of growth on savings of about two, so that a shift in earnings 
growth from 5 to 10 percent will generate an increase of 10 percentage points 
in the saving rate. If  we take the results from the third row of  table 9.4, the 
effect is 0.137, which is less than a tenth of the typical cross-country estimates. 
Even the first row estimates, which condition on neither cohort nor age effects, 
add up to only 0.33. Hence, while the within-cohort growth effects are present 
and while they cast doubt on the life-cycle model, they probably cannot ac- 
count  for  a major  share of  the  relationship  between  saving  and  growth  in 
Taiwan. 
The second panel of  table 9.4 reports similar regressions, but with the de- 
pendent variable the rate of growth of consumption. These correspond closely 
to the standard “excess sensitivity” tests in the macroeconomic  consumption 
literature; see, for example, Campbell  and Mankiw  (1991), who look for a 
relationship between consumption growth and anticipated growth in labor in- 
come. The only difference between the top and bottom panels, apart from the 
dependent variable, is that the first lag of earnings growth is excluded from the 
unrestricted regression; if consumption growth is correlated with unanticipated 
growth in earnings, as the life-cycle theory supposes, and if earnings are mis- 356  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H. Paxson 
measured, there will  be  a spurious correlation between  consumption  growth 
and lagged earnings  growth that does not contradict  the model. The results 
provide  no evidence of excess sensitivity in Taiwan, although there are good 
reasons to question  the power of the test. Lagged earnings growth has little 
predictive power for consumption growth in any of the regressions, but it also 
has little predictive power for current earnings growth. With  little  ability to 
anticipate earnings growth, we cannot tell whether the component of earnings 
growth that might be anticipated is or is not correlated with changes in con- 
sumption. 
9.6  Summary and Conclusions 
Where do these results leave us, and what is their implication for saving in 
Taiwan, particularly for retirement  saving in a rapidly aging population? We 
have found it a good deal harder to find fault with the life-cycle theory than 
we supposed would be the case. Although consumption seems to move very 
closely with income, the Taiwanese save a great deal, and the comovement can 
be explained in terms of earnings shocks, which induce a short-run correlation 
between consumption and income, together with a taste for rapid consumption 
growth with age, which  itself might be attributed to the intertemporal incen- 
tives generated by very high rates of return in a rapidly growing economy. We 
also find that younger cohorts have higher saving rates, as is to be expected 
given falling fertility and rising life expectancy. If  we accept such a picture, 
we can attribute at least part of Taiwan’s high saving ratio to farsighted young 
consumers preparing for a “modern” old age in which they will be thrown on 
their own resources, rather than on those of their married sons. 
We  are not entirely convinced that the picture is quite so simple, although 
we have no really coherent alternative to offer. The life-cycle explanation for 
the coherence between consumption  and income seems farfetched compared 
with some simpler and more parsimonious  story in which consumption is di- 
rectly linked to income, although we also recognize that it is difficult to explain 
why people should behave in this way, especially  in a high-saving economy 
where liquidity constraints are unlikely to be a problem. There is certainly no 
evidence of excess sensitivity in our results, though better and more powerful 
tests might yield different results. We also found evidence that saving responds 
to growth within cohorts, something that is consistent with the importance of 
habits in consumption. Even so, the effect is not nearly as large as that deliv- 
ered by  simple life-cycle stories and is small compared with other empirical 
evidence on the relationship. Our data do not show dissaving or even decreased 
saving among older households;  indeed the estimated  age effects in saving 
behavior increase steadily with age. Of course we recognize that this evidence 
is severely contaminated by the processes of household dissolution and combi- 
nation as individuals age. Nevertheless, such results are hardly overwhelming 
evidence in favor of the life-cycle model. We therefore hesitate to endorse the 357  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
position that the life-cycle model is alive and well and living in Taiwan, espe- 
cially if such a position is taken to imply that there is no need for public action 
to supplement social security among those who will be old 25 years from now. 
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Comment  Jonathan Skinner 
Taiwan has enjoyed rapid per capita economic growth during the past 40 years. 
Saving rose dramatically, while fertility rates declined sharply. As Deaton and 
Paxson show, such large changes provide a natural “laboratory” to test nearly 
any theory of  saving and consumption. The consistent aggregate growth allows 
its pure effect on consumption to be distinguished easily from the usual back- 
ground noise of  business cycles and age-related changes in income. Further- 
more, they have the right data set to perform the analysis-a  consistent, appar- 
ently reliable 15-year synthetic panel of survey data on families in Taiwan. 
They develop what seems to be the only sensible way to distinguish among 
year effects, age effects, and cohort effects and use this method to show the 
strong impact of growth on the younger cohorts’ consumption and saving deci- 
sions. They present evidence that they interpret as supporting the orthodox life- 
cycle model, but also present evidence that cannot be explained by  any life- 
cycle model. In these comments, I will make two points. First, studying saving 
behavior in Taiwan, as Deaton and Paxson do, is an important exercise, pre- 
cisely because it is a country that managed to more than double its personal 
saving rate during the  1960s. And second, the light such study casts on the 
life-cycle model is perhaps not as reassuring as Deaton and Paxson suggest. 
The life-cycle  model  has been  an  enormously  successful paradigm  of  con- 
sumption behavior and has spawned a huge number of  variants. Nearly  any 
empirical phenomenon  can fit somewhere under the “big tent” of  these many 
variants. Hence the evidence presented does not convince me that “the” life- 
cycle hypothesis has adequate predictive power to explain the many variants 
of saving behavior in different countries. 
It  is  useful  to gain  some perspective  on  the postwar  history  of  income 
growth and saving in Taiwan (see Rabushka  1987; Hwan  1991). Figure 9C.1 
shows aggregate real growth in GDP, and in national saving rates, for Taiwan 
between  1952 and  1989. Income growth has averaged 8.5 percent  annually 
during the entire time period,  with the sharpest decline during the oil price 
shock of the early  1970s.’ Saving only increased during the mid-I960s, from 
an average rate of 9.9 percent of GDP during 1952-65  to 24.3 percent during 
1970-89.  Most of  this  increase  was generated by  personal  (individual plus 
unincorporated  business)  saving; between  1952-65  and  1970-89,  personal 
saving rose from 4.6 percent to 14.3 percent. 
Why did the personal saving rate shift so dramatically  during the  1960s? 
Domestic investment seemed to have remained  stable during this period, but 
when foreign investment (particularly from the United States) was cut back in 
the 1960s, domestic personal saving took up the slack. Whatever the cause of 
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Fig. 9C.1  Saving and income growth, Taiwan: 1952-89 
this shift in saving, it should be remembered in interpreting the Deaton-Paxson 
results that the habit of saving during the 1970s was still a recent phenomenon. 
Laggard saving during the  1950s and  1960s by the older generations in the 
Deaton-Paxson data could explain why they appeared to share little in the rapid 
aggregate growth occurring during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Deaton  and Paxson carefully  document  the  dramatic  changes in fertility 
rates during the period of analysis and suggest that such changes may in part 
be responsible for the rapid saving rates. They calculate that parents in their 
mid-thirties can expect to have only half the (average) number of male children 
as parents now in their seventies. With fewer children to support parents in 
their old age, the younger parents must substitute into financial wealth, thereby 
increasing saving as fertility declines.* One problem with such a hypothesis is 
that, in  a general life-cycle-bequest  model, the effect of  fertility on saving 
rates is indeterminate: if parents are saving for bequests or inter vivos transfers, 
fewer children could mean less required saving. The timing of  the fertility and 
saving changes is consistent with this alternative theoretical model: saving in- 
creased rapidly in the mid-l960s, just when the “baby-boom” parents would 
have been at an age typically consistent with rapid wealth accumulation (e.g., 
ages 35-50).  That is, different variants of  the life-cycle model could explain 
either a negative correlation between saving and fertility rates (as in Taiwan) 
or a positive correlation (as in the United States in recent years). 
A “celebrated prediction” of the life-cycle model, the positive relationship 
2. Paul David (1977)  advances this hypothesis to explain high saving rates and declining fertility 
in the United States during the nineteenth century; also see Hammer (1986). 360  Angus S. Deaton and Christina H.  Paxson 
between  saving and income growth, is also confirmed quite strongly in this 
analysis. While I have no quibble with the compelling empirical evidence, I do 
question  whether  the  theoretical  prediction  is  robust  to  relatively  minor 
changes in the specification of  the life-cycle model. In the Modigliani ( 1986) 
view, each cohort might be characterized  as 4 percent richer, where + is the 
overall  productivity  growth  rate, but  the  age-earning  profiles  are fixed over 
time. That is, log earnings at age a for cohort i is 
Y,,, = g(a) + 4J> 
where a is normalized to zero for the youngest age group, and g(a)  is the age- 
earning path for the benchmark cohort i = 0. In this case, the young are wealth- 
ier and hence save more, while the less wealthy old dissave less; on net, capital 
accumulation is positive and large in magnitude. 
A  different  view  comes from  the  Summers (1981)  life-cycle  model,  in 
which a 4  percent cohort growth rate is realized by every worker; 
y,,, = g*(u) + (a + i)+, 
where g*(a) is the age-earning profile in the absence of productivity growth 
for cohort  i = 0. In  the Modigliani case, the log annual growth in earnings, 
denoted y, is given by  g(a) -  g(a - 1); any productivity  growth is enjoyed 
solely by  the youngest cohort, who begins life with an initial wage 4 higher 
than those one year younger. By contrast, the Summers specification implies 
that 
g = g*(a) -  g*(a - 1) + +, 
so that the “rising tide raises all boats” or at least boats of all ages. This speci- 
fication implies that age-earnings profiles should be quite steeply sloped dur- 
ing periods  of  rapid  growth, which  is certainly  consistent  with  Deaton  and 
Paxson’s figure 9.5. 
With this slightly different specification of earnings growth, the predicted 
correlation between saving and growth is easily re~ersed.~  Current generations 
anticipate large increases in future earnings and want to spend some of that 
lifetime wealth today. In such a model (absent borrowing constraints), saving 
can easily plummet to zero in the presence of productivity growth. This is not 
to say that one model is superior to another, but rather that  any correlation 
between saving and growth could find comfort in a life-cycle model. 
Perhaps the most startling and noteworthy contribution of this paper is the 
finding that consumption tracks income, even when the individual is saving a 
large fraction of his income. I agree with the authors that this tracking behavior 
is hard  for the  standard life-cycle  model or even a “buffer stock” model  to 
explain. In fact, I would argue that the authors have found an economic rar- 
ity-an  empirical  phenomenon  that  every  mutation  of  the life-cycle  model 
rules out on theoretical grounds. 
3. It is straightforward to perform such calculations using the model in Summers (1981) 361  Saving, Growth, and Aging in Taiwan 
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